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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model in which research universities stock their libraries with
academic journals by picking a threshold level of quality below which no subscriptions are
ordered. This framework is used to analyze two sets of initiatives aimed at dealing with
journal−price inflation: (1) promoting low−cost modes of production and distribution, e.g.,
e−journals, and (2) changing tenure and promotion requirements in order to reduce the
incentive for scholars to prioritize quantity over quality. Although these initiatives are, in the
author's view, laudable in many respects, the model makes the point that the range of quality
among journals that libraries subscribe to may shrink as a result. If there are gaps between
contemporary standards of ``quality'' in academic publishing, and what turns out to be useful
to society in the long−run, then a ``scholarly communication'' policy that is sensitive to
pluralism with respect to journal−quality is recommended.
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URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2002/volume4/EB−02D60002A.pdfThis paper studies a one-period decision problem in which a research university attempts
to pick the quantity and quality of academic journals, along with other inputs, to maximize its
output of knowledge.1 A key simplifying assumption in this paper, supported by interviews
with research librarians collected in order to learn about actual journal-acquisition decisions,
is that universities make changes in their journal holdings primarily by changing a variable
referred to here as the quality-cut-oﬀ-point, i.e., the threshold level of quality below which
no subscriptions are acquired. Although universities are moderately price-sensitive within
a particular stratum of quality (for instance, canceling a high-quality journal whose price
is ﬁve times that of its high-quality peers), most of the change in the quantity of journal
holdings is accomplished by raising or lowering the quality-cut-oﬀ-point. Therefore, this
paper attempts to develop an equilibrium model for studying the choice of the quality-cut-
oﬀ-point, separating a continuous range of quality levels into two discrete “subscribe” and
“don’t subscribe” regions. The size of the “subscribe” region is referred to as the quality-
spectrum (or breadth of quality).
The quality-cut-oﬀ-point model helps to analyze how diﬀerent policy approaches to deal-
ing with high levels of journal-price inﬂation might aﬀect the range of quality that char-
acterizes a typical research university’s journal holdings. Thus, the paper’s main ﬁndings
concern the connection between policies aimed at organizing a more eﬃcient mechanism
for producing and distributing “scholarly communication,” and the quality-spectrum. The
primary motivation for studying this connection stems from the possibility that some “schol-
arly communication” policies, while beneﬁcially reducing the cost of acquiring journals in
the aggregate, may have the un-intended consequence of shrinking the quality-spectrum.2
If there is a gap between the meaning of “quality” as libraries and journal-acquisition
committees measure it, and the meaning of “quality” implicit in society’s social-welfare func-
tion, then shrinking the quality-spectrum has the potential to be socially harmful. Such a gap
may arise simply because of measurement error, due to the inherent diﬃculty of determining
1Of course, universities may have objectives other than “to produce knowledge.” But for the purpose of
analyzing policy proposals aimed at dealing with the increasing cost of academic journals, the focus here is
on the connection between journal acquisitions and the “production of knowledge,” broadly conceived so as
to encompass both the education and innovation aspects of “producing knowledge.”
2The real-world analogues to the exogenous parameter changes that are subsequently interpreted as
“policy changes” in the context of this paper’s model are described in Magner’s (2000) article in the Chronicle
of Higher Education, the 1998 Association of ResearchLibraries (ARL) Membership Meeting Proceedings, and
the ARL website (www.createchange.org/resources)describing new policy initiatives for dealing with journal-
price inﬂation. Among those policy initiatives, a common theme is the attempt to cut the cost of producing
journals by moving to electronic (as opposed to paper) distribution. A second, more controversial approach
(advocated by former Stanford University President Gerhard Casper, among others) calls on universities
to change the criteria for tenure and promotion in order to reduce the incentives for scholars to prioritize
quantity over quality in their research. Beyond the cost-cutting and “change the credentialling criteria”
approaches (which are analyzed using the model in this paper), there are a number of other innovative
policy ideas which, unfortunately, do not neatly ﬁt into the framework of the model. These include temporary
(rather than permanent) copyright transfer agreements (Shulenburger 1998), Varian’s (1997) vision of a new
online review process, the new “review of web-papers” journal-concept being undertaken by the creators of
NotaJournal, and the activism of economist Ted Bergstrom (2001) in calling for reviewers to refuse working
(for free) for journals with high cost/quality ratios. The empirical stylized facts regarding journal-price
inﬂation (and analyses of its possible causes) can be found in McCabe (2002), Bergstrom (2001) (see also
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/ tedb/), Branin and Case (1998), Odlyzko (1998), Sosteric (1997), Adams and
Griliches (1996).
1in the present which types of research will prove useful in the future. Or the gap in meanings
of “quality” may be caused by ineﬃciencies in the review process, when editorial decisions
are based partially on political considerations and not purely on “the merits.” Regardless of
its source, the rationale for being interested in the quality-spectrum lies in the potentially
harmful consequences of a mis-match between private versus social deﬁnitions of “quality.”
If quality is measured poorly or distorted by market failures in the academic industry, then
policies which compress the quality-spectrum — even if that means re-allocating journal
expenditures away from “low-quality” journals into “high-quality” journals (which sounds
like it ought to be eﬃcient) — may actually impede rather than accelerate progress in the
academic community’s pursuit of socially-useful activities.
This paper demonstrates that seemingly eﬃcient policies, e.g., those that reduce the
marginal cost of producing journals, can reduce the size of the quality-spectrum. The link
between changes in the quality-spectrum and social welfare has not yet been integrated
into the formal analysis and, in this sense, the results should be seen as preliminary. It is
hoped, nevertheless, that the quality-cut-oﬀ-point model will spark greater consideration of
the possibly detrimental eﬀects on “pluralism in the quality domain,” as debates about the
eﬃcient distribution of scholarly communication move forward.
1 The Quality-Cut-Oﬀ-Point Model of Journal Acqui-
sition
Three categories of inputs in the knowledge-production process K are considered: (1) the
stock of journals J owned by an individual university, (2) the level of expenditures on com-
plementary goods and services C, and (3) the average level of knowledge-production across
all research universities ¯ K. The last input ¯ K is included in order to capture the beneﬁcial
network externalities that characterize a typical knowledge-diﬀusion process in the absence of
signiﬁcant barriers, and is taken as given by each individual university.The second category
of inputs consists of “complementary expenditures,” a very general category that includes all
non-journal university expenditures that contribute to the production of knowledge. With
an exogenously given university budget B (determined by state legislators in the case of
most public institutions, or by a board of trustees for most private institutions), the comple-
mentary expenditures can be re-expressed as C = B − E,w h e r eE denotes the university’s
expenditures on journals.3
The ﬁrst input, labelled J, represents the aggregate quantity of academic journals ac-
quired by the university. The aggregate quantity of journals directly aﬀects the production
of innovative research and contributes to the education of students (and perhaps the commu-
nity surrounding the university). For the purpose of producing knowledge in this sense, it is
debatable how best to aggregate a university’s collection of journals. One may presume that
high-quality journals are more productive than low-quality journals, and therefore ought to
3By putting non-journal expenditures B − E directly into the production function, it is implicit that
the prices of non-journal expenditures are stable, so that changes in B − E reﬂect varying quantities of
non-journal inputs, rather than changes in the prices of non-journal inputs. Even without this assumption,
the model simply requires a modiﬁcation of the interpretation of “the prices of journals” (introduced below).
By the modiﬁed interpretation, the price of a journal is a relative price, in units of non-journal expenditures.
2receive additional weight in the process of aggregation. By the same token, there are reasons
why possessing a high-quality journal may not be as beneﬁcial as holding a low-quality jour-
nal. For instance, the contents of a high-quality journal are likely to be discussed more widely,
with overlapping coverage at conferences, other high-quality journals, and through less for-
mal channels such as online chat groups. Owning a lower-average-quality journal containing
results that are less accessable through alternative media may therefore be more valuable for
the researchers and students at a particular university. Another argument along these lines,
albeit somewhat cynical, follows from the proposition that truly innovative material is less
likely to appear in high-quality journals. This problematizes what is meant by “quality” of
a journal. It also serves as a rationale for applying uniform weighting in aggregating journal
holdings. This is an important modeling choice and is therefore stated explicitly: in this
paper, the production of knowledge depends on a uniformly-weighted aggregation of journal
holdings.
One of the key questions, then, is how universities choose J. In order to study how this
choice is made, I interviewed a small sample of research librarians, discovering what seems to
be a common pattern. When those in charge of deciding which journals to acquire actually
make their decisions, an attempt is usually made to ﬁrst assign individual journals (within a
particular ﬁeld) to categories of relatively uniform quality. Together, these categories form a
family of categories, ordered by quality. This is not exactly the same as “ranking journals,”
since each quality-category has multiple journals in it. After having partitioned the universe
of all journals into a family of quality-categories, the university then decides which categories
will be chosen from by coming up with a quality-cut-oﬀ-point. Simultaneously, the quantity
of journals from each quality-category must also be decided. Thus, the choice problem
remains fairly high-dimensional, involving both a choice over quality-categories and a choice
of quantities demanded from each category.
An interesting aspect of the interview testimony on journal acquisitions, however, is that
the choice of quality-categories strongly dominates, in terms of diﬃculty and importance.
In contrast, the within-category choice of quantity is usually regarded as pre-determined, by
journal acquistion choices from the past. The multi-dimensional decision-problem of picking
which journals to acquire winds up boiling down to picking a quality-cut-oﬀ-point below
which no journals are acquired, and above which, all journals currently subscribed to are
continued.
In order to formalize this stylized account, we consider a continuum of quality-levels,
indexed by a, in the unit interval [0,1]. Corresponding to each level of quality a,t h es y m b o l
q(a) refers to the quantity of journals at that quality-level to be acquired by the university.
The pre-determined within-quality-level demand function is given by
q(a)=e
−p(a)/a, (1)
where p(a) is the price of a journal with quality a.4
The strong assumptions implied by working with an ap r i o r i(rather than derived) within-
category demand function q(a) allow this model to focus on the choice of the quality-cut-oﬀ-
4The functional form in (1) reﬂects a moderate degree of within-category price-sensitivity, with price-
elasticity −p(a)/a, which may be increasing or decreasing depending on the price function p(a). The func-
tional form of q(a) also implies, for ﬁxed p(a), higher demand for journals in a higher-quality categories, i.e.,
q(a)i si n c r e a s i n gi na holding p(a) constant.
3point, denoted α ∈ [0,1]. Once decided upon, the quantity q(a) is acquired for all a ∈ [α,1],
whereas no journals are acquired in the region [0,α). The aggregate quantity of journal












Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology with respective journal-, non-journal-, and network-
elasticities of production γ, η,a n dφ, the knowledge production function (the university’s





With the budget constraint C(α)+E(α)=B already imposed through the substitution of
B −E(α)f o rC(α), the university’s problem amounts to a simple (unconstrained) optimiza-




The second-order condition is not satisﬁed for all price functions, and must therefore be
checked on a case-by-case basis, along with the corner solutions “acquire all journals” (α =0 )
and “acquire no journals” (α =1 ) .
1.1 Examples
Before closing the model by deriving the supply of journals, some examples are provided
which relate diﬀerent price functions p(a) to diﬀerent optimal choices of α.W i t hp(a)=a,


























which has the unique (in the unit interval) solution α =0 .846. Corresponding to these
parameter values and the price function p(a)=a, the knowledge-production function (in
5Taking the logarithm of the objective function and setting the ﬁrst derivative to zero produces the
equation
γJ
 (α)/J(α) − ηE
 (α)/(B − E(α)=0 .
Equation (5) results after substituting J (α)=−ep(α)/α and E (α)=−p(α)ep(α)/α, and canceling the term
−ep(α)/α.
4log scale) is presented, as a function of α, in Figure 1. By inspection and by numerical
evaluation of the second derivative of knowledge at the maximizer, the objective function is
seen to be concave, with unique global maximizer α =0 .846.
For the convex price function p(a)=a2, concave price function p(a)=a0.5, and constant
price function p(a) = 1, a unique global maximizer continues to exist.6 The knowledge-
production functions for these (and other) price functions are depicted in Figure 1. The
maximizers corresponding to diﬀerent price functions are listed in Table 1. The model’s
potential for generating non-concave regions of the objective function is demonstrated by
the knowledge-production function corresponding to the price function p(a)=1 .6+a in
Figure 1.
1.2 Proﬁt-Maximizing Journal Producers
The owner of a for-proﬁt journal at quality-level a is assumed to take the market demand
function Iq(a)=Ie−p(a)/a as given (I is the number of research universities), choosing p(a)
to maximize proﬁt. Assuming a linear cost function with ﬁxed cost f and marginal cost c,
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function can be written
Ie
−p(a)/a(p(a) − c) − f. (6)
The proﬁt-maximizing price p(a) for a journal of quality a is therefore
p(a)=c + a. (7)
Under the specialized assumptions of this model, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms charge universities
marginal cost plus a markup equal to journal quality.
1.3 Equilibrium
For every level of quality a, the price of journals is c + a and market demand for journals
is Iq(a)=Ie−p(a)/a. It is now possible to endogenize the equilibrium quality-threshold α.












−(c+a)/ada = B. (8)
By implicitly diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to the exogenous parameters c, B,a n d
η
γ,a
number of policy proposals aimed at dealing with rising journal prices can be analyzed.
2 The Eﬀects of Exogenous Changes on the Quality-
Spectrum
It can be veriﬁed that, whenever the second-order condition is satisﬁed (
d2K
dα2 < 0), the
expression [
η
γ(p (α)J + pJ )+E ], which appears in the denominator of equations (9), (10),
6The integrals that deﬁne J(α)a n dE(α) do not always have a closed-form expression, as in the case of
p(a)=1w h e r eJ(α)=E(α)=
 1
α e−1/ada. These cases are handled easily, however, by numerical methods,
both in solving the ﬁrst-order condition and in checking the second-order condition.
5and (11), is negative. With this result, and the substitutions
p(a)=c+a, J
  = −e
−(1+c/α),E


















































γ +1 ) ( c + α)e−(1+c/α) > 0. (11)
Equation (9) makes the counterintuitive point that reductions in the (marginal) cost of
producing journals can actually reduce the quality-spectrum, measured in this model by the
size of the interval [α, 1], i.e., 1−α. By reducing the cost of producing journals, the quality
threshold α rises, meaning that the quality-spectrum 1 − α shrinks. Falling journal costs
lead universities to re-allocate journal expenditures away from low-quality journals and into
deeper coverage of high-quality journals.
It is not obvious that a shift in the composition of university journal holdings which
reduces the number of “low-quality” journals is socially beneﬁcial. Whether this outcome is
seen as good or bad is, indeed, a subjective issue pointing to the deeper problem of deﬁning
what “quality” in the context of academic journals actually means. So long as one maintains
conﬁdence in quality-ranking schemes, i.e., accepting the notion that there exist objective
criteria which succeed in ordering the universe of journals from best to worst, then it is
straightforward to conclude that quality-spectrum compression is good. When the quality
index a is a true indicator (or a highly correlated proxy) of objective quality, then society
is best served by focusing on high-quality journals and pursuing policies (e.g., reducing c)
which serve that end.
On the other hand, the wider the gap between the quality index (a) used by librarians
and academics, and “objective quality,” the greater the probability that quality-spectrum
compression leads to journal collections missing worthwhile material. This existence of this
gap provides a rationale for wanting the quality spectrum 1 − α to be large. I.e., the
uncertainty that makes it diﬃcult to precisely measure the quality of new research leads to
an argument in favor of pluralism with respect to quality.
The relevant question lies in determining how eﬀective high-quality journals are at devot-
ing attention to the research that best serves society’s interests. If high-quality journals can
in fact sustain their high quality in the objective sense of minimizing the gap between what
is currently thought to be “high quality” and what ultimately turns out to be “high quality,”
then society’s interest may be served by relying solely on them. If, however, high-quality jour-
nals take part in producing the meaning of “quality,” they may fall victim to self-reinforcing
practices that limit rather than augment convergence toward objectively high-quality re-
search. A concentration in the quality spectrum may be more prone to “premature lock-in”
and cyclic rather than progressive patterns in the evolution of thought.
6In addition to dα
dc < 0, the model generates two other comparative static results, contained
in equations (10) and (11), each corresponding to distinct policy approaches to dealing with
journal-price inﬂation. The model tells us that, by increasing the university budget B,t h e
quality-spectrum 1−α will rise, just as one would anticipate. In dealing with rapid journal-
price inﬂation, simply increasing the university’s overall budget has indeed been the de facto
policy at a number of research universities with endowment funds large enough to keep up
with annual double-digit percentage increases in the cost of journal subscriptions. While this
may reﬂect a savvy strategic approach for establishing a better relative position or “market
share” within the world of knowledge-production, competing in this manner amounts to a
“library-spending arms race,” which has dubious eﬃciency implications.
Equation (11) states that a shift in the knowledge-production function by which non-
journal expenditures become more productive relative to journal holdings winds up increasing
the quality-cut-oﬀ-point α, thereby reducing the quality spectrum 1 − α.W h e n
η
γ goes up,
the optimal mix of inputs required to produce any level of knowledge shifts. At the pre-
adjustment levels of journal and non-journal expenditures, the marginal product of journal
holdings is too low, and journal holdings must therefore be reduced in order for marginal
products of the two inputs to match. Because quantity demanded q(a) (at quality level a)
does not respond to
η
γ, this re-allocation of inputs (away from journals and into non-journal
expenditures) can only be accomplished by raising α, i.e., by reducing breadth.
3C o n c l u s i o n
In its focus on the quality-spectrum (1 − α), the model in this paper cautions that policies
pushing for a switch to electronic journals, although infused with sincere optimism about the
capacity of new cost-reducing technology to broaden the dissemination of scholarly commu-
nication, may wind up narrowing the ﬁeld in certain respects. Evaluating the social-welfare
consequences of that kind of narrowing ultimately will require further investigation into the
meaning of journal “quality,” and perhaps empirical analyses of the role “low-quality” jour-
nals have played in producing big ideas, i.e., important innovations which were introduced
in less prestigious journals and only subsequently reached the mainstream.
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The parameter values used in these calculations are:
η
γ =1a n dB =0 .1.
9Figure 1: Knowledge-Production Functions for Various Price Functions
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